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ABSTRACT
The debate over whether political democracy is the least bad regime, as Churchill
once said, remains unresolved because history has been ignored or misread, and because
recent statistical studies have not chosen the right tests.  Using too little historical
information, and mistaking formal democratic rules for true voice, has understated the gains
from spreading political voice more equally.
This paper draws on a deeper history, reinterpreting five key experiences to show
how the institutional channels linking voice and growth are themselves evolving with the
economy.  Up to about the early nineteenth century, the key institutional link was property
rights and contract enforcement.  Since the early nineteenth century, the human-investment
channel has assumed an ever-greater role.  This trend will probably continue.
A telltale sign of damage to growth from elite rule is the under-investment of public
funds in egalitarian human capital, especially primary schooling, relative to historical norms
for successful economies.
________________________________________________
On the afternoon of November 11th, 1947, the Opposition leader Winston Churchill
gave the House of Commons, and posterity, his famous defense of democracy:
No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.  Indeed it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that
the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all
constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who
are their servants and not their masters....”
1
In fact, Churchill was trying to block the advance of democracy on that November
day.  He was defending the power of the House of Lords to block measures advanced by a“Voice and Growth,” Page 2
popularly elected government.  The House of Lords was a hereditary old boys’ club
2 that was
not required, and not even allowed, to be elected by the people.  Churchill was in the trenches
fighting against a Labour government bill that would trim the number of years that the Lords
could block a bill from two years to one year.  Labour’s purpose in attacking the Lords’
slight remaining powers was to clear the way for nationalizing the steel industry, a
controversial move that the Lords were determined to block.  Our reading of subsequent
history arouses at least some sympathy for Churchill’s opposition to steel nationalization.
3
Yet the fact remains that he was fighting for a rich hereditary elite against a popularly elected
government.  Churchill lost that battle, and democracy advanced another step.
So far we have two different Churchills on the subject of democracy’s merits for the
economy and civilization: The great orator endorsing popular democracy as the best we can
do, and the conservative defending the last vestiges of hereditary elite power against the
excesses of democracy.  Actually, there was at least one other Churchill on the subject.  This
third Churchill demanded popular democracy as a means to achieve a righteous redistribution
from landlords to the rest of society.  As a young Liberal rabble-rouser on the election trail in
1909, this younger Churchill derided the House of Lords as “that home of the ancient British
aristocracy.”  As he told a cheering Liberal Club dinner in Birmingham,
The powers of the House of Lords to impede ... are strangely bestowed, strangely
limited, and still more strangely exercised....  Posing as a chamber of review, remote
from popular passion, far from the swaying influences of the electorate, it
nevertheless exhibits ... a party spirit upon a level with many of the least reputed
Chambers in the world....  It is not possible for reasonable men to defend such a
system or such an institution.
4
His reason for poking at the Lords and rallying the mass electorate was redistributive and
revolutionary.  Young Churchill was a leading land-tax Liberal demanding redistribution
from landlords to workers and the poor.
To ask “Was Churchill Right?” is therefore to ask “Which of the three Churchills was
right -- the populist orator, the elitist Conservative, or the young redistributor?” Let us follow
the populist orator, and ask about the economic side of his saying.  Let us take the Churchill“Voice and Growth,” Page 3
view to mean that more popular voice in democracy is better for economic growth over the
long run.  Is that a correct reading of history?  Or did China’s government raise its growth
chances by crushing democracy at Tiananmen Square?  If superpowers and international
agencies want to promote growth and fight Third World poverty, should they support full
democracy, limited elite democracy, or firm autocracy?
As an aid to renewed exploration of such issues, this paper offers the following
suggestions:
(1) Past attempts to judge the growth impacts of political regimes have used history
too little, have mistaken democratic rules for true voice, and have focused on an overly
narrow concept of property rights.  This has led to an under-valuation of the importance of
spreading political voice more equally over the whole population.
(2) Defining democracy less narrowly than in the past literature helps to reconcile
these suggestions with five historical experiences that might have seemed to suggest negative
effects of fuller democracy on economic growth.
(3) The institutional channels that link voice and growth are themselves evolving with
the economy.  Up to about the early nineteenth century, the key institutional link was
property rights and contract enforcement.  Since the early nineteenth century, the human-
investment channel has assumed an ever-greater role.  This trend will continue.
(4) A telltale sign of damage to growth from elite rule is the under-investment of
public funds in egalitarian human capital, especially primary schooling, relative to historical
norms for successful economies.  Policies toward basic human capital formation are a key to
the better growth performance of full-franchise democracies over either autocracies or
(especially) elite democracies.
THE DEBATE OVER DEMOCRACY, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH
Conflicting Views and Defective Tests“Voice and Growth,” Page 4
Those who have debated the effects of democracy on growth have divided into four
camps: optimists, pessimists, neutralists, and agnostics.  The neutralists and agnostics
dominate right now, though I will argue that their dominance is based on our not having
chosen the right empirical measures and the right tests.
Most optimists have shared Churchill’s modesty about the case for democracy.  The
twentieth century has left many members, but few Panglossian Whigs, in this optimistic
camp.
5  A fair recent statement of muted optimism is Douglass North’s 1990 statement that
modern democratic society with universal suffrage is best, as Churchill said, but it’s a poor
best.  It often fails to meet five specific conditions for translating net national costs and
benefits into policy: people must know how policies will affect them, their agents must vote
for their preferences, the net deadweight gain or loss must be known, the losers must be
compensated, and all this at low transactions costs.
6  The optimist belief that democracy
promotes growth rests on a faith in universal suffrage and participation as the best way to
keep high-level mistakes in check.  Somebody has to warn and threaten the boss, and the
more voices that speak out, the better -- yet this may not suffice to prevent serious mistakes.
Optimists share the low expectations of Albert Hirschman, who argued that every
organization, private or public, lapses into bad performance, and that a mixture of exit and
voice is required to minimize the costs of its errors.  Democracy is no cure, but it enhances
the voice option, so that the best critics don’t all exit.
7
Pessimists fear that democracy lowers income and growth by yielding to demagogues
and to demands for current consumption, in the form of aid to declining sectors, power to
unions, and taxation for safety nets.  For Schumpeter, democracy undermined the recovery of
European capitalism through a tyranny of popular myopia caused by overly empowered
intellectual critics.
8   Still focusing mainly on the industrialized OECD democracies, Mancur
Olson once hypothesized that the peaceful aging of a stable democratic regime brought
“arteriosclerosis,” a buildup of vested interests that skimmed rents and choked off growth.
9
Concerning the Second and Third Worlds, many writers have drawn a political corollary
from Gerschenkron that impoverished countries could awaken and catch up only if autocrats
suppressed consumption and transformed institutions from above, just as Imperial Germany
and Russia did in the past.
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The twentieth century offers pessimists a lot of anecdotal support.  Didn’t the Weimar
democracy give Hitler a plurality in 1932?  Didn’t fairly democratic Chile give a plurality to
Salvador Allende in 1970, wrecking the economy within three years?  Also gloomy is the
more recent behavior of some so-called democracies in electing Lukashenko in Belarus,
Kuchma in Ukraine, and similar economy-wreckers in other former Soviet republics.
11  The
mid-1990s were a high tide for fearing the economic costs of such “illiberal democracies,”
and applauding Pinochet, Lee Kuan Yew, and the other firm hands in control of newly
industrializing countries.
12
Neutralists feel that the net effect of democracy versus autocracy is zero. Adam
Przeworski and co-authors conclude from a massive statistical study of 137 countries
between 1950 and 1990 that
“there is no trade-off between democracy and development, not even in poor
countries.... We hope to have put the entire issue to rest.... [T]he entire controversy
seems to have been much ado about nothing.... [T]he recently heralded economic
virtues of democracy are yet another figment of the ideological imagination.”
13
The neutralist camp includes a series of statistical studies finding that there is no effect of
switching between autocracy and democracy, although regime durability matters within
either type of regime.
14   Neutralism also includes those who agree with Robert Barro and
Niall Ferguson that growth is maximized by an intermediate amount of democracy, beyond
which fuller democracy erases any net contribution to growth.
15
Agnostics dismiss all past attempts to measure the growth effects of democracy as
flawed and inconclusive, and with good reasons.  Most of the tests fail to correct sufficiently
for simultaneity bias and regime selectivity bias.  The survival of political leaders and
political regimes is itself endogenous, along with growth, education, and economic
inequality.  It will not do to test for the effects of, for example, democracy or inequality on
the rate of growth without simultaneous-equation techniques that incorporate these
feedbacks.  Regime attrition also affects the apparent regime-specific rates of growth.
Lacking such adjustments, the discerning reader of the statistical literature remains agnostic
about whether democracy promotes growth.
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The statistical literature on democracy and growth has failed to meet the requirements
for a fair test, for even more reasons than the agnostics have given.  Five main kinds of
requirements have not been met satisfactorily:
(1) Historical experiences covered:
•• Current practice in the statistical literature: using time-shallow postwar samples, to
which a few studies add historical anecdotes.
•• Needed: much deeper time dimension, including the disaster cases from outside the
data-set club.  Also, the range of experience must fit the counterfactuals being
explored.  If we want to know the effects of a political regime on growth, we must
study a range of polities and periods over which political regimes varied greatly.
(2) Accounting for growth versus accounting for well-being:
•• Current practice: sticking to the growth rate in GDP per capita.
•• Needed: a well-being measure allowing for effects of regimes on at least life
expectancy, and preferably time-use freedom and other freedoms.
(3) Political regime variables:
•• Current practice: using indices of democracy and autocracy, on 0-10 scales or just
binary, based on procedures and laws.
•• Needed: measures of the equality of political voice in practice, and of its time-path
over many decades or centuries.
(4) Finding the main institutional channels:
•• Current practice: showing that political regimes affect investors’ views of property
rights, which in turn affect investment and growth.
•• Needed: a mapping of the increasingly dominant institutional channel, the human-
investment policies through which regimes affect growth.
(5) Simultaneous feedbacks:
The causal structure needs to fit the plausible time-spans over which the links
between voice, GDP, inputs into education, and other forces are built up.  Getting the
lags right plays a major role here.“Voice and Growth,” Page 7
Let us turn to the first four of these five fronts here, emphasizing historical interpretations.  A
final section will return to the econometric mode of the literature, spelling out those
simultaneous feedbacks and quantifying the different effects of political regimes.
Which experiences to study?
Almost all explorations miss most of world history before 1950.  The best exceptions
are two wider-ranging quantitative comparative histories going back to the Middle Ages, a
DeLong-Shleifer article on princes and cities and the current work of Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson.
17  Most other forays into the world before 1950 are careful refinements on
familiar tales of Britain and America, and I shall argue that the British tale needs revision.
By throwing away history as we know it, scholars intrigued by the growth consequences of
political regimes have missed a great turning point.  Before the eighteenth century, there was
autocracy and slow growth.  Since then, rapid growth has arrived and been concentrated in
the most democratizing countries.  We waste information if we either ignore the earlier
history or just assume that the causation ran only from poverty to repression.
Even the post-1950 world is misrepresented time and again, by looking only at the
data-set countries and by misjudging China’s experience.  Lacking numbers for the data
matrix, scholars leave out much of the Soviet bloc republics, including Yugoslavia and Cuba.
They also omit the turmoil countries of Africa, East Asia and the Middle East.  These
omissions feature autocracies like those in North Korea, all of Indochina, and Yemen.  Also
omitted are several tiny Caribbean democracies, whose economic performance has been
satisfactory.  The selection bias in our comparative statistical studies is severe.
The mishandling of China’s experience is especially dangerous.  Political scientists
and economists make a compound mistake by focusing on the rapid growth of China’s GDP
per capita since the 1970s.  Even within those years, they give China’s autocrats credit for
rapid growth that really shows only the effects of moving from the complete disaster of the
late Mao years to a semi-reformed semi-corrupt regime.  Yet the regressions consider this a
case of super-growth under a firm centralized autocracy.
18   The reliance on a single cross-
section has also prevented scholars from seeing one of the main points I suggest below:  The“Voice and Growth,” Page 8
net gains from more complete democracy are evolving, and probably growing, over the
decades.
Worse yet, the usual blinders block our view of the greatest peacetime policy disaster
of all time, Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward.  The best estimates are that his policies of
communization and rigid controls over food distribution costs killed between 16 and 30
people between 1958 and1961, more than the best guess of about 7 million in the Soviet
famine engineered by Stalin in the early 1930s.
19  These deaths and the related suffering,
which were concentrated in food-surplus areas, were definitely linked to the issue of
democracy versus autocracy.  By 1958 serious criticism, or even scrutiny, of Mao’s policies
was effectively ended by the “Hundred Flowers” trap, in which he first called for criticism
from below and then persecuted those who gave it.  No effective voices could challenge the
Great Leap, even as its horror became obvious.  Soon after the famine, Chairman Mao
himself, without referring explicitly to the famine, seemed to draw a lesson about the need
for “democratic centralism” when addressing about 7000 cadres:
“Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below;
the situation will be unclear; you will be unable to collect sufficient opinions from all
sides.”
20
We must all strive to learn from Chairman Mao.  He himself did not learn, however, and
soon imposed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to purge critics, both real and
imagined.  Amartya Sen has plausibly drawn the more general lesson that major famines are
unlikely to occur under true democracies, when all adults and a free press are able to speak
up.
21  The existence of a global market for food does no good if the autocrat blocks all access
to it.
 The frequent mishandling of the China case illustrates a larger drawback of the
recent scholarship on democracy and growth since 1950.  Virtually all of it uses as its sample
a single cross-section of nations, or at best a time-shallow pool.  This makes it impossible to
distinguish between the effects of any featured variable, say democracy or property rights,
and that dark unknown called “fixed country effects,” a compendium of our ignorance about
forces that may be unique to each nation.  Worse yet, the cross-sectional approach throws“Voice and Growth,” Page 9
away the historical clues offered by major regime changes in this last half-century.  For
China, as just noted, Mao and his capitalist successors are lumped together.  For Chile,
scholars have thrown Frei, Allende, Pinochet, and the democracy of the 1990s together,
hoping to learn something from the average of all regimes.  For Korea, five major switches
between democracy and autocracy occurred since 1953, again obscuring the political
meaning of any overall average performance.
Growth versus well-being
For many issues, GDP per capita has proven its usefulness as a strong correlate of
well-being.  The issue of democracy and growth is different, however.  Most obviously,
freedom is valued for itself, and people in the past have given up large amounts of income for
it.
22   The obvious value of freedom itself is set aside here, to confront the tougher issue of
whether income has to be sacrificed for it.  Less dispensable, however, is the effect of
political regimes on life expectancy.  As the case of China’s Great Leap has just reminded us,
regimes must be judged in part by the deaths they hasten.
Even within the confines of GDP per capita, growth rates have been overused.  As
James Tobin warned when steady-state growth theory had its vogue, you can’t eat rates.  You
can only eat levels.  In the background here is the deceiving use of recent income levels as an
exogenous control variable.  Scholars, including this author, have used the rates and levels as
equivalent in regressions that have controlled for past income levels.  That works well
enough for many purposes, but not if we need to appraise the impact of political regime
history, which lasts for more decades than the income variable covers.  The statistical
literature on political regimes and growth hides much of the effect of regime history in the
lagged income variable, as well as in fixed-country effects.
Which concept of democracy?
It is time for scholars in political economy to retreat from a sound scientific decision
they have reached regarding the definition of democracy.  To distance their analysis from any
hint of circular reasoning, some writers have insisted that democracy must be defined only in“Voice and Growth,” Page 10
very narrow procedural terms, as a setting in which there are formal elections for the chief
executive and a legislature, and there is at least some opposition.  Explicitly avoiding any
outcome dimensions such as “accountability,” “responsiveness,” “representation,”
“equality,” or “civil rights,” or any social and economic sources of political privilege has
kept this narrow procedural definition innocent of letting economic success define
democracy.  The resulting analysis soundly shows that this narrow definition truly has little
or no effect on economic growth, within the confines of the chosen models and data sets.
23
How wide is the audience that will accept this narrow result as the answer to their
curiosity about the economic implications of “democracy,” a concept that has always meant
governance by all the people?  Many fights about the extension of political rights have been
about the replacement of elite rule with full franchise, in much of history and in much of the
Second and Third worlds today.
24   One can broaden the definition of who has political voice
without plunging down the slippery slope into the circularity of asserting that democracy is
partly defined by the economic success it fosters.  We naturally expect that the greater the
share of adults who have political voice, the more democratic is the polity.  Yet scholars’
taxonomies of political regimes miss big differences in the share of adults who have any real
voice.  This is most evident in the indices that went back before World War II.  For example,
the Polity index rates the United States a perfect democracy, a “10,” from 1871 on, somehow
missing the Jim Crow Laws altogether.  Similarly, one would expect caste and the
intimidation of opposition voters at election time to be reflected on any widely useful
definition of democracy.  Yet the procedural approach precludes recognizing such “social”
dimensions of political voice, and therefore sees no difference in the political rights of
Indians and Australians in the late nineteenth century.
25  The current practice tends to
dichotomize too much between full democracy and autocracy, perhaps because it has not
sufficiently explored either pre-1950 history or the realities of political voice in Latin
American and Asia today.
The narrow procedural categorization of democracy will leave historians unsatisfied.
Most European countries extended the franchise in stages, “where Freedom slowly broadens
down from precedent to precedent,” and a main task is to sort out the causes and
consequences of the transition from elite rule to democracy.
26   In the history of the Americas
the same difference between elite franchise and full franchise is at the heart of differences in“Voice and Growth,” Page 11
schooling, income inequality, and economic growth.  It seems to play a major role in
explaining why the Southern states fell behind in the United States, why Costa Rica is so far
ahead of Guatemala and El Salvador, and why North America pulled so far ahead of the rest
of the Hemisphere.
27
The leading indices of political regimes also miss the gender dimension of political
voice.  Even on strictly procedural grounds, one would want a concept of political democracy
to be affected by the denial or granting of voting rights to half the adult population.  Yet the
historic shift to women’s voting rights clearly had no effect on Banks’s regime categories or
on the Polity index of democracy -- at least not on the indices recorded for the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, or Switzerland.
28  What purpose were the
indices of democracy and freedom designed to serve, if denial of political voice to half the
adult population has no bearing?
29
Finally, the current practice of classifying regimes focuses on the central national
government alone.  This practice would do little damage in an historical setting in which the
key institutions are, and must be, centralized.  Such was the case centuries ago, when most
damage to economic growth came from the top, so that the Netherlands or England could
shine just by having institutions that credibly limited the power of the king or prince.  But in
a world where local governments make the decisions that matter most to economic growth,
the usual indices of democracy or autocracy may fail to explain why different countries and
regions develop so differently.  Granted, correctly categorizing the central government
sometimes captures differences in policy effectiveness at the local level, because the central
government intervenes well or badly.  But, as we shall see, nineteenth-century Germany was
one of the settings in which the central regime is unrelated to local policies that drove much
of Germany’s growth.
WHICH CHANNEL OF INFLUENCE --
THROUGH PROPERTY RIGHTS OR THROUGH HUMAN CAPITAL?
The Property-Rights Channel“Voice and Growth,” Page 12
One of the keys to economic growth is surely freedom from confiscation of one’s
non-human capital.  Scholars in economic history and political economy have linked
governance to economic growth through the kinds of institutions that affect economic
growth: property rights and the “rule of law.” What Montesquieu and Adam Smith had
intuited has become a well-articulated theory of institutional history by Douglass North,
Mancur Olson, Barry Weingast, and their co-authors.  As soon as either personal far-
sightedness or revolutionary coercion makes some rulers pre-commit to enforcement of laws
limiting their powers to confiscate and tax certain areas, those nodes of liberty develop cities,
commerce, and industry.  Limiting the ruler’s power eventually strengthens the state itself.
30
This explanation works especially well for earlier history, as one might have surveyed
it from, say, Scotland in 1776.  So filled was the world with myopic and rapacious rulers that
any haven from confiscation could become a node of growth and prosperity.  The panel tests
of DeLong and Shleifer, and of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson have shown that the
property rights channel fits medieval and early modern history systematically, not just in
separate case studies.
31
The same focus on the rule of law and property protection has now rightfully become
a prescription applied time and again by international agencies monitoring the Second and
Third Worlds.
32  It is also the basis for repeated use of investor-service indicies of “country
risk,” which measure corruption, confiscation, and default all over the world as indicators of
property protection.
The Human Capital Channel
Yet as the economy evolves, different productive inputs become more crucial.  We
have long known that economic development makes non-human property, especially land,
less and less important to growth, while human capital becomes more important.  The
gradual shift toward an economy based on human knowledge and communication shifts the
mix of assets that democracies and autocracies need to develop and protect.  But sticking
with the property rights of non-human capital, many scholars have under-emphasized the
human-capital channel, the one rightly stressed in the EHA Presidential Addresses of Richard
Easterlin and Claudia Goldin.
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means that advice to today’s transition economies and developing countries needs to place at
least as much emphasis on policies toward education and health as on the protection of non-
human property.
The comparative growth literature assigns a strong role to educational attainment,
even when the authors choose to downplay it.  The Barro-Lee studies end up featuring
educational attainment as a key determinant of economic growth.
34   The Clague-Keefer-
Knack-Olson studies, while intent on showing the property rights channel, nonetheless show
a significant influence of schooling on GDP per capita whenever they give it a chance.
35
And although Bils and Klenow have established that difference in schooling did not explain
more than a third of growth differences in a narrow accounting sense, they nonetheless show
the likelihood that there are at least some externalities from schooling that should supplement
their measure of the growth influence of schooling.
36  The latest overall surveys of the issue
still find a strong effect of schooling on growth.
37
That political voice strongly influences schooling and therefore growth is becoming
increasingly clear in recent comparative work by economic historians.  Historical differences
in the spread of suffrage go a long way toward explaining which countries’ children got
educated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
38   Suffrage also had a systematic effect
on the tax effort put into educational finance in my samples of 24 countries between the
1880s and the 1930s, a half-century in which some countries spread voting rights down to the
lowest-income classes, while others either remained autocratic or kept political voice
restricted to the top-income elite.  The willingness to spend tax money on primary education
was significantly greater in full democracies than in elite-vote limited democracies.  In fact,
the countries least willing to spend taxes on mass primary education were not the autocracies,
but the elite-vote countries.  The same was not true of public spending on university
education, however, for which elite-vote countries and autocracies were about as willing to
spend as were the full democracies.
39
What makes the link between broad suffrage and primary schooling so important is
that the marginal growth effect of primary schooling is particularly high in less developed
settings, such as the pre-1914 history of the now industrialized countries or the Third World
today.  In a well-governed country, the true social returns to schooling should be equated
across levels of schooling, and equated with other rates of return throughout the economy.“Voice and Growth,” Page 14
Failure on this front explains much of the underdevelopment observed both today and in the
past.
We have strong indirect evidence that poor societies systematically under-finance
primary education.  The evidence is indirect because it is confined to so-called “social rates
of return” on the attainment of a higher level of schooling.  These rates of return are as
encompassing as they can be, but some of the returns to education are still left out.  For one
thing, such rates of return can only capture the returns and costs of extra school years, not the
returns and costs of raising the quality of schooling at each level.  That is, they can show only
the damage done by rationing schooling, not the damage from poor schooling.  For another,
they cannot measure the net external or inter-generational benefits of education, and are
“social” only in that they include the public-budget effects of public financing and later tax
collection from more educated adults.  For what they are worth, however, those studies
consistently show that the social rate of return on the extra (unattained) primary schooling is
much higher in today’s Third World than either the marginal returns on higher education in
the same countries or the rates of return measured for any level of schooling in high-income
countries.
40
Under-investment in primary schooling reflects two defects at once.  First, it reflects
the usual imperfection of capital markets, which block low-income families from borrowing
to educate their children, whose high later incomes could have repaid a loan at low prime
interest rates.  Second, it also reflects insufficient use of taxpayer funds to conquer this
capital market imperfection.  Given the pervasiveness of capital market imperfections and of
external benefits from education, taxpayer effort on behalf of public education has been key
to raising educational performance.  For two centuries now, the global leaders in educational
attainment, test scores, and human earning power have been countries that have relied on
public funding at the primary and secondary levels.  Tax money does not simply displace
private or philanthropic funding.
41
The failure to equilibrate rates of return suggests an elitist policy bias, one that
sacrifices GDP growth and discriminates against those who would benefit from extra primary
education -- particularly the poor, the rural, and females.
Some simple indicators can reveal an elitist bias in a country’s educational policy,
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education expenditure and admissions patterns with those of high-income high-technology
countries in the same era.  The first fingerprint that an elitist bias would leave relates to the
primary school “support ratio”
Primary-school support ratio =
(public funding for primary school per child of primary-school age)
divided by (GDP per capita).
Note that the school-age population here is an entire age group, not just pupils, in order to
combine both support per pupil and the attendance or enrollment rate.
42  Such a support ratio
will typically rise with GDP per capita.  A country’s educational policy leaves such an elitist
fingerprint, Fingerprint #1, if it has a lower support ratio for primary education than a typical
country of the same income level, or a poorer country, in the same historical time-period.  In
such a case, this Fingerprint #1 means that the country is passing up some economic growth,
either to keep powerful groups from paying taxes or to keep the masses unschooled as an
object in itself.  We will illustrate the use of this clue in the next section.
For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this support ratio test is our best prima
facie clue to an elitist bias in educational policy, one that sacrifices some economic growth.
For the twentieth century, two other clues can support this one.  The twentieth century
brought a general rise in public support for education at all levels, in tandem with the shift
toward greater and greater reliance on advances in knowledge and skills.  Thus for the
twentieth century, elite bias can also show up as relatively generous public funding for higher
education, given that higher-income and politically privileged families typically have better
access to that higher education.  With taxpayers now subsidizing all levels of education and
with greater data availability, we can use two other clues that suggest elite bias at the expense
of overall GDP growth:
Relative support ratio for higher education =
(public support for tertiary education per pupil)
to (public support for primary education per child of primary-school age),“Voice and Growth,” Page 16
and Inequality of support favoring the best-off =
A direct measure of the concentration of public support for education into educating
those with the highest levels of educational attainment, such as a gini coefficient or a
share of subsidies received by the best-educated ten percent.
Fingerprint #2 is left when policy gives a higher relative support ratio for higher education
than other countries with the same or higher average incomes.
43  Granted, it is conceivable
that a poorer country might need to concentrate its education budget on training at the top, so
that national leaders and teachers are trained first, before advances in schooling can trickle
down to the masses.  But the rate-of-return evidence, plus smoking-gun historical narratives
of elite antipathy to mass school for its own sake, suggests a growth-sacrificing elite bias if
Fingerprint #2 is found.  Similarly, Fingerprint #3 show up whenever a direct measure of
inequality of public funding favors the best educated groups, relative to typical practice in
leading countries. The calculated social rates of return are lower for tertiary education than
for primary, and there is no clear externality argument in favor of subsidizing higher
education more than primary education in a lower-income setting.
Aided by these clues to growth, we now turn to reinterpreting growth effects of
political voice, and the relative importance of the property rights and human capital channels
in conveying those effects.  I have selected five settings in which prevailing opinion seems to
have underestimated either the case for democracy, or the damage done by elite rule on the
education front, or both.
FIVE REINTERPRETATIONS
Britain as Leader and Laggard
When did Britain lead the world in democracy, and through which channel did it
stimulate growth?  The conventional answer is that from 1688 or earlier until World War I
British democracy shone because it supported private property rights, and because its landed
elite was willing to accommodate industrialization.  While the conventional stories are partly“Voice and Growth,” Page 17
correct for the early modern era, the property rights story has been undergoing revision, and
may need further revision, while the downside of undemocratic Britain’s fiscal and
educational policy needs more attention.
The conventional tale is that Britain took off after 1688 thanks to the Glorious
Revolution’s putting constitutional limits on the throne’s ability to cheat creditors and impose
sudden taxes.  Once Parliament became the supreme budgetary authority, private businesses
and holders of government bonds both felt more protected.  Private capital accumulation
blossomed, and the state was able to fight wars more effectively because it was more credit-
worthy and levied more predictable and acceptable taxes.
44
Subsequent scholarship has reinforced the variant relating to government
creditworthiness, but not the role of 1688 in supplying cheaper loans for private capital
formation.  Gregory Clark has drawn the new road map for the story of 1688 and property
rights.  Clark finds that the Glorious Revolution had no visible effect on private interest rates,
which were trending slowly downward long before and long after 1688.  On the other hand,
he does find that 1688 lowered the interest rates on the public debt of the newly constrained
government.  Unable to repeat default episodes like the 1672 Stop of the Exchequer, the
throne credibly pre-committed to loan repayments, cutting the interest rate it was charged.
45
If the only clear improvement in property rights springing from 1688 was an
improvement in royal creditworthiness and perhaps in the efficiency of British taxation, what
are we to do with the argument that the Revolution in 1688 protected Britain’s private capital
and sparked the Industrial Revolution?  The issue needs further exploration.  We must
consider the possibility that improvements in English private property rights were a much
more gradual affair, extending back to the middle ages, and improving slowly ever since.
Consider, for example, the interest rate history charted by Homer and Sylla, by Clark, and
others.  It appears that real interest rates were declining persistently, if not monotonically,
from the 1251-1350 century to around 1900, not only in England but also in France,
Flanders, Germany, Netherlands, and Italy.  Perhaps the story of improving capital supply,
presumably helped by improvements in private property protection, is a story to be told for
much of Western Europe over six centuries, not a tale of a few constitutional triumphs.
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Against the gains in British property rights and public finance we must weigh the
long-term costs of the bias of British politics toward the landed elite in the eighteenth and“Voice and Growth,” Page 18
nineteenth centuries.  Granted, there are ways in which the landed interest made its
accommodation with liberalism and industrialization, helped by its being a heavy urban
landowner.  In the final telling, we will still agree with the judgment that the landed elite
made this accommodation more smoothly in Britain than elsewhere.
47  Still, scholars have
under-emphasized several ways in which it actually checked Britain’s industrialization and
growth.  Perhaps with taxation as with early British elite democracy, we tend to give early
British fiscal institutions too much credit because other countries’ institutions were even
worse in those days.
The anti-growth side of landed elite power left some of its fingerprints on Britain’s
fiscal structure.  The usual revenue calculations overlook ways in which Britain taxed the
advancing modern sectors.  Any telling of the story of secure British property rights should
factor in the heavy stamp duties on commercial, legal, and financial services.  By the period
1815-1841 these taxes on such documents as property and contract records had risen to claim
12-15 percent of government revenue, more than the taxes on land and income.  Any story of
elite accommodation to industrial capital and to the spread of knowledge must also confront
the duties on glass, windows, bricks, paper, and candles as well as those stamp duties.
48   We
must also remember that customs duties on imports, which were between 22 and 40 percent
of government revenue throughout the period 1700-1870, discouraged exports of
manufactures, and therefore manufacturing production, for the simple reason that in the long
run any tax on foreign trade restricts both imports and exports.
That tax system was also more regressive than is usually thought.  Using simple
“flypaper” calculations of tax incidence might seem to show that the tax revenues took a bigger
share of consumption from the rich than from the poor.
49   Yet the usual calculations of the tax
revenues paid directly by the different classes miss a major fiscal redistribution from workers
and the poor, as well as industrialists, toward the landed interest.  Britain’s Corn Laws raised
the price of grain and basic foodstuffs, drawing resources back into agriculture at the expense of
industry -- yet they are almost invisible in the government revenue accounts because they were
designed to be virtually prohibitive in the 1660-1792 and 1815-1843 eras. To make wheat
expensive was also to make bread expensive, raising the cost of living for the landless masses.
Statistical regressions suggest that a 10 percent increase in the English price of wheat tended to“Voice and Growth,” Page 19
raise the London price of bread by 6-8 percent.
50  The rough effects of the Corn Laws on the
prices of wheat, bread and a poor worker’s cost of living were:
Approximate % effect of the Corn Laws on the price of
 cost-of-living bundle
Period wheat bread (if breads = 40%)
1770s 26% 18% 7%
1780s 25% 18% 7%
1820s 44% 36% 14%
1830s 29% 23% 9%
1840-45 24% 19% 8%
Any reckoning of the fiscal policies of Georgian and early Victorian England must consider
these long episodes of policy-induced food scarcity, hurting both industry and the poor.
51  The
only interlude of truly progressive taxation in the era of landed dominance was the French War
era 1793-1815, which included a temporary income tax.  But as soon as the war was over, this
was repealed and the records were burned.
Turning to the education channel, some might expect that Britain fits the current
theme well because Britain was a leader in both democracy and schooling.  Britain does
indeed fit the theme well, but on an opposing note:  Britain was a laggard, both in democracy
and in schooling.  In terms of democracy, it was not until the 1880s that half of the adult
male population could vote, a lag of decades behind North America and France.
52  In terms
of schooling, both the enrollment figures and the expenditure figures imply that Britain fell
behind by mid-century or earlier, and did not begin to catch up to the leaders until after the
Fees Act of 1891 provided the taxpayer support that was already provided in other
countries.
53
The public expenditure figures supply us with that “Fingerprint #1” of elite bias in
education policy, as shown in Figure 1.  The lag of Britain in public support for primary
schooling can be seen in Figure 1 by comparing the support ratios on the vertical axis either
for the same years or for the same Maddison-estimated level of real GDP per capita.  As the
fingerprint test requires, British taxpayers supported primary education less than did some
countries with lower average incomes in the same historical era.  While the underlying“Voice and Growth,” Page 20
political explanation is complicated, with the education issue getting mixed in with religious
and constitutional issues, the nineteenth-century debate identifies aristocratic Tories, the
Church of England, and the House of Lords as groups consistently reluctant to have taxes
paid to give the broad mass of children a competitive secular education.
54   By holding back
public mass education, Britain’s still-elite franchise in the early and mid-nineteenth century
held back Britain’s relative skills and GDP per capita for a few decades.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Thus the early lead and later lag in British political freedoms seem to have altered the
timing of British superiority, pointing away from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Britain led in freedom and living standards before 1688, along with the Netherlands.  Britain
began slipping in ways better traced back into the nineteenth century, not concentrated in the
twentieth.  We are better prepared for these reinterpretations of Britain’s glorious era if we
have studied the changes in economic historians’ best estimates of Britain’s growth rates in
terms of GDP per capita.  Taking Angus Maddison’s guesses as a summary of conventional
expectations shows us that the United Kingdom’s growth rate per capita fell behind that of
the Americas and Australasia already in the 1820-1870 period, and behind most of Europe as
well during the 1870-1913 period.
55  Furthermore, Clark’s current re-estimations of British
national product are showing even lower rates of growth between 1700 and 1830.  Britain
was already more advanced by 1700 than we had realized.  British institutions shone best in
the earlier era up to the eighteenth century, when the rest of the world was still generally mis-
governed.  Elite rule had its anti-growth side in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The Germanies
How does the delayed rise of Germany as an economic power illuminate the
relationship of political voice to economic growth?  We are given two different stories, one
for Germany before Napoleon invaded, and one about the nineteenth-century rise of Prussia
and unified Germany.  Neither story deals effectively with the role of private property rights
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The diversity of the Germanies has posed serious problems for the interpretation of
the growth effects of German governance.  Was the political fragmentation of Germany
before the nineteenth century good or bad for economic growth?  One might have imagined
that small principalities would compete as tax havens, just as cities did elsewhere in Europe.
Yet the pioneering attempts at comparative classification of regimes and property rights up to
the early nineteenth century have retreated to treating all of Germany as an area uniformly
ruled by unconstrained rulers, with no protection for private capital, as if Germany were no
different from Albania or Sicily.  Germany thus becomes a tale of poor growth under local
despots until the early nineteenth century.
56
What happened next to governance and growth, during the nineteenth-century rise of
Prussia and unified Germany?  A different literature takes over, telling us that equally
absolutist monarchs promoted economic growth from above, without any new constitution
constraining their power.  How could the absolutism switch from being bad to being good for
private capitalism and economic growth? .  And how was the strong growth achieved?  The
Gerschenkronian story of state and bank control is inconsistent with Germany’s never having
achieved as cheap a supply of capital as Britain or France.
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To get the effect of German governance right, and to choose the right institutional
channel for its growth effects, we must first remember how Germany excelled in the
nineteenth century.  The one clearly outstanding source of growth for which the world envied
nineteenth-century Prussia and Germany was its pioneering system of mass education.
Unfortunately, this source has also been mishandled.  Seeing an autocratic monarchy and a
world-leading educational system, scholars have linked the two in an unsatisfactory ad hoc
manner.  Falling into a trap set by this simple correlation and by the overuse of statutory
history, they have argued that the imperial state-building of the Prussian and German empires
fostered education because, well, it would make the state stronger -- leaving us to wonder
why the Austrian, Russian, Turkish and other empires concluded that their ambitions
required suppressing mass education.
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Yet the “absolutist” central government in Prussia and Germany had yielded control
of educational finance and development to localities right after the humiliating defeat by
Napoleon.
59   Control from above consisted of little more than periodic conservative edicts
about curriculum and patriotism, plus pay scales for teachers.  Schools were funded locally,“Voice and Growth,” Page 22
by local appointees, with the result that tax-based primary education flourished where the
local demand was already stronger in the late eighteenth century, namely in cities and toward
the north and west.  Where Junker power and state funds were most evident, in the rural east,
the least school funding and the lowest graduation rates obtained, despite an imperial policy
of wanting to Germanize the Poles in school.  The pattern in the smaller non-Prussian states
was similar.
The most promising way to resolve the puzzles of governance and growth in the
Germanies is to recognize that limited local freedom promoted growth through the education
policy channel, starting in the urban north and west in the late eighteenth century and early
nineteenth.  The most conspicuous source of Prussian and German growth was the source
that the undemocratic central governments did not control.  In this decentralization of control
over the amount of schooling to provide, the Germanies were like North America and unlike
Britain, where Parliament retained direct control of education throughout the nineteenth
century.
India’s Backward Democracy
Above all, our understanding of the relationship of political voice to economic growth
must come to grips with the fact that the world’s largest democracy is one of the world’s
poorest nations.  Since independence, India’s has had a higher democracy index than France.
Why is India’s average income still so low, even among developing countries?
60
Adding to the puzzle is that fact that India’s property-rights institutions are also not
bad in investors’ eyes, relative to those of other developing countries.  Granted, on the
corruption front, some of the international ratings put India worse than the average
developing country, and lately even worse than China.  Yet even without a good corruption
score, India in the 1990s ranked above the average developing country in overall “rule of law
and business environment,” and ranked even above the world average in the categories “law
and order,” “property rights and rule-based governance,” and some government-efficiency
indicators.
61  If democratic India’s general business environment is so acceptable, we have
even more reason to wonder why India is so poor.
To make headway on this deep puzzle, let us begin with the 1990s evidence that India
policy undersupplies primary education while being much more generous at higher levels.“Voice and Growth,” Page 23
This will establish that the human capital channel is the main conduit from institutional
problems to low incomes in India’s case.  The clarity of these current symptoms will at least
help us begin the search for historical sources.
At the start of the 1990s, as India was beginning to emerge as an exporter of software
and other highly skilled services, almost half of Indian adults -- 36 percent of men and 61
percent of women -- were illiterate.  A consensus of in-depth studies has found a serious
distortion of Indian public funds in favor of higher education at the expense of mass primary
education.
62  For example, the World Bank in 1992 was clear in its recommendations for
Indian educational policy:
The aggregate level of public spending on education is probably adequate.... But
some changes are called for in the allocation of those resources.  In particular, more
spending should be allocated to primary education, mainly to improve its ability to
retain students.... The shift in funding in favor of primary education can be achieved
by increasing the contribution of private financing in higher education....
[The structure of unit educational costs] reveals a strong bias in favor of
higher education at the expense of primary education....  The structure of enrollments
and financing arrangements result in a distribution of public spending that is skewed
toward the privileged.
63
India’s anomalous educational policy stands out in an overall Asian perspective.
Table 1 exposes all three of those elitist fingerprints in educational policy.  First, the support
ratio for public primary education, that same measure used in Figure 1 above, was lower for
India than for any other of these ten Asian nations except India’s immediate neighbors,
Bangladesh and Pakistan.  The next two fingerprints, the ones showing the relative
generosity of taxpayer support for higher education, confirm that the problem is not just
meagerness of public funds.  Only Bangladesh is more biased in favor of the highest
educated on all counts.  India’s policies seem to tilt away from primary education, by any
regional or global standard.  To these three fingerprints, one could add that the Indian
teaching profession at all levels has been dominated by males, again more so than in any
other non-Muslim Asian nation other than Nepal and Cambodia.“Voice and Growth,” Page 24
[Table 1 about here.]
India’s lack of commitment to primary education manifests itself in huge class sizes,
teacher absenteeism, and high drop-out rates.  The problem is worst in India’s “heartland”
states, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, and (until the late 1990s) Madhya Pradesh.  In the village
of Palanpur in western U.P. in 1983-4, a single teacher was responsible for carrying out the
national mandate to educate all children of ages 6-10.  There were 158 such children.
[T]he most notable feature of the village school is that it has more or less ceased to
function.  The root of the problem is fairly obvious.  The single teacher [upper-caste
son of the village headman] has a ‘permanent’ post, and his salary, which is quite
high by local standards, is effectively unrelated to his performance.... [H]e has little
incentive to exert himself.
In 1983-4, the village teacher was taking full advantage of these
circumstances.  More often than not, he did not even take the trouble of coming to
school at all.  When he did, he would be accompanied by ten or twelve children at
most, mainly sons and daughters of his own close relatives....  This did not prevent
him from cheerfully entering 135 names in the school enrollment register.
64
It is also in these poorer heartland states that secondary and higher education seems to
have been supplied most abundantly in recent decades.  In 1966, for example, the Lucknow
National Herald voiced its suspicions by noting that India’s poorer heartland states had a
higher share of high school students going on the university than Britain, France, Japan, or
India’s better-off southern states.  One underlying factor seems to have been the
entrepreneurial opportunity to create new high schools and colleges as a political base and
cash cow for siphoning government grants at low cost.  Running a primary school, which
was handed down to village-level panchayat rule in the 1950s, is less lucrative, though it is
still an opportunity to solidify a local partisan political base.
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How could decentralized democracy fail to reform such policy failures, decade after
decade?  If everybody really had voice in India, one would have to conclude that democracy
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Churchill’s defense of democracy from this indictment would be to show that India is not the
full democracy that its franchise rate would suggest. That is, one would have to show that
much of the Indian population has been systematically excluded from having any real voice
in tax and educational policy.  One should also show evidence that the lack of full democracy
was greater in those heartland states where the education policy failure was greatest.
Even though nobody has put the whole chain of argument together yet, there is at
least a prima facie case that political voice in India has been highly restricted and
disproportional, despite the holding of full-suffrage elections.  As an invitation to the fuller
research effort this historical subject demands, my task is to note some clues that political
voice has always been denied to the lower income groups, castes, and tribes, particularly in
the heartland states, and that this appears linked to elitist education policy.
The first clue is that the symptom itself, an educational system designed for the elite,
has been a feature of India’s history at least back to Thomas Babbington Macauley’s
infamous Minute on Indian Education in 1835.
66   Granted, every generation of British and
Indian leaders in the twentieth century gave lip service to free public education for all.  In the
transition to Indian provincial autonomy the 1930s and 1940s, most provinces passed
compulsory education laws.  But in the absence of funding and enforcement, these were no
more effective in India than in any other polity where unfunded compulsion tried to precede
the private demand for mass schooling.  The gap between grants per university student and
subsidies per primary student apparently even widened under provincial autonomy in the
1930s and 1940s.  Gandhi and the Congress Party leadership continued the rhetoric, but
declined to provide the funds needed for the daunting task of conquering illiteracy.  Gandhi
himself added to the problem by demanding that alcohol could not be legal, and therefore not
taxed for schools and other programs, and by refusing to abandon his scheme for ‘self-
supporting” education in which illiterate children would learn all they needed to know by
working at menial jobs.
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Both in the transition to independence and since 1947, political voice in India was
limited, first in law and then in practice.  The differences in democracy among Sri Lanka,
India, and Pakistan were already evident in the 1930s.  Britain gave Sri Lanka universal adult
suffrage in 1931, only a few years after the last restrictions on women’s suffrage were
removed in Britain itself.  Provincial elections were held under this new franchise in 1931“Voice and Growth,” Page 26
and 1936.
68  In India, by contrast, the Montague-Chelmsford reforms approved by Parliament
in 1919 extended the suffrage only to include more property-taxpayers, persons with
educational qualifications, and landholders.  The landless and urban workers were still not
included; in most municipal areas the electorate was about 14 percent, and in rural areas it
remained a tiny 3.6 percent.
69   For its part, the Muslim League wanted little to do with
democracy.  The differences in franchise and voting persisted into the Independence era.
Voter turnout in Sri Lanka rose from 55.8 percent of the electorate in 1947 to 76-78 percent
in two elections of 1960, to 86.7 percent in 1977.  By contrast, in India it rose only from 46.6
percent in 1952 to 60.5 percent in 1977, and dropped back to 57.0 percent in 1980, even
though the legal franchise share had risen from 55 percent to 99 percent across the 1960s and
1970s, and Pakistan has remained autocratic.
70   These differences correlate with Sri Lanka’s
much better performance in primary education, though not in higher education, than either
India or Pakistan.  And within India, the voter turnout rate again correlates with the relative
development of primary education and average incomes.  Voting, primary schooling,
literacy, and income all continue to be higher around the rim, in the South, Punjab and
Haryana, and lower in the heartland states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Orissa.
What mechanism might have linked limited political voice with the discouragement
of primary education?  We know that single-member pluralities, like the electoral institutions
of India and the United States, create a bias in favor of the largest and longest-organized
political parties.  The Congress Party was given decades of clear primacy among political
parties during its leadership of the Independence movement.  In the first thirty years of
Independence its leadership was hard to dislodge, and it won a majority of seats despite never
capturing a majority of votes.
71   Once Congress’s educational policy had set the favoritism
for higher educational into all the initial five-year plans, no lower-class or lower-caste
opposition could easily dislodge that policy.  Voice was effectively restricted by history and
by political institutions.  One could view India under the “Congress Raj” as a case of Mancur
Olson’s institutional arteriosclerosis.  Political elites became increasingly entrenched, and
institutions were frozen in practice.  In India’s case, that transition may have secured the
power not only of the well-off in the heartland states, but also of teachers as a tenured lobby
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Yet surely a bedrock of political exclusion in India has been its tradition of caste,
tribe, class, and ethnicity.  No matter how full the franchise or how much power has
devolved to provinces and to village panchayats, even the most local rule seems to remain
concentrated into long-organized groups.  For its part, the central government had tried to
equalize power with affirmative actions giving the “backward classes,” “scheduled castes”
and tribes not only job quotas, but even reserved legislative constituencies.  Yet control over
taxes and especially education remains largely provincial, an arrangement that appears to
have perpetuated the handicap of primary schooling for the disadvantaged groups and the
heartland states.
72  Tentatively, the answer might be that the world’s greatest democracy fell
behind before the late 1990s because it was not much of a democracy in ways that were
crucial for education policy.  In this respect, twentieth-century India may have been the
mirror image of nineteenth-century Germany: an ostensible democracy that failed to be
democratic on the education front, as opposed to an ostensible autocracy that led the world in
locally initiated education.
Asian Tigers
Lee Kuan Yew is justly proud of Singapore’s growth and prosperity under his rule.
Singapore has developed both of the institutional channels featured here:  protection of
business property rights and heavy subsidies to education. Lee has extrapolated from his
success to become a leading spokesman for autocracy in troubled settings like postwar East
Asia.  For Lee, recent Asian history shows that autocratic capitalism is far superior to
democracy:
“The regime in Beijing is more stable than any alternative government that can be
formed in China.  Let us assume that the students had carried the day in Tiananmen
[Square] and they had formed a government...  What kind of China would they have
today? Something worse than the Soviet Union.  China is a vast disparate country;
there is no alternative to strong central power.”
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But if Lee is right that autocracy works well specifically within East Asia’s different
culture, it is well to compare all the experiences within that region.  Is democracy a drag on
growth within East Asia, stretching from Mongolia to Indonesia, and from Myanmar to
Japan?  Lee’s critics are correct.  If one surveys performance from 1960 to 1998, the region’s
overall experience shows a positive, not a negative, correlation of democracy and economic
growth.  Omitting Japan or communist regimes does not reverse this result.
74  The only way
that one can cast Asian autocracy in a good economic light is to be extremely selective. Lee
Kuan Yew has not seen fit to comment on the smooth transitions to democracy in Korea and
Taiwan.  Basically, his hypothesis is based on a self-congratulatory contrast of successful
Singapore and (pre-democratic) Taiwan with anybody growing more slowly under a different
regime.
The Welfare State: Not a Channel
Finally, how does the broader comparative history judge that third Churchill, the
young Liberal who wanted full democracy because it would redistribute from landlords to
pensioners and the workers?  The conventional answer today is that full democracy threatens
to drag down economic growth through taxes and transfers that stifle initiative.
What comparative quantitative history seems to show, however, is that nothing flows
through this channel.  Even though fuller democracy probably raises transfers,
75 there is no
clear effect of extra transfers on GDP, despite widespread suspicions to the contrary.  All
kinds of empirical studies, as opposed to theoretical modeling exercises and simulations,
show that while excessive taxes and transfers could lower GDP, they did not do so in the
high-budget welfare states.  I have called this the “free-lunch puzzle” of the welfare state.
For this there seem to be two related reasons.  First, the welfare-state democracies
have designed many of the transfers so as to promote health and to minimize work
disincentives.  Second, the democracies that choose high-budget welfare states have also
chosen tax mixes that actually lighten the burden of average and marginal rates on saving and
investment for given average tax rates.
76  Thus the economic risks of redistribution were not
manifested in the history of the industrialized OECD countries.  The dangers of redistribution
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rich in 1970-1973.  Of the three Winston Churchills, then, the brash young Liberal of 1909
defended a riskier democracy than did Churchill the orator of 1947.
TOWARD BETTER TESTS:  FITTING ECONOMETRICS TO HISTORY
We need not rely solely on such historical narratives to make the basic point that
recent statistical studies have missed the strength of the voice-growth link.  Even if we wear
some of the blinders of the recent analyses confined to the data-set club experiences, we get a
more positive answer to Churchill’s question just by fashioning tests that get the feedbacks
and the historical timing right.  The few key requirements, again, are these:
(1) a panel of experiences in which the distribution of voice differed greatly over both
time and space;
(2) more information on the distribution of voice than the mere procedures of
executive and legislative power can reveal;
(3) careful thinking about the long lags that identify how political regime history and
GDP growth interact with each; and
(4) special attention to human capital policies, especially public schooling.
A particularly good set of historical experiences for illuminating this whole causal
structure is era from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth, in which full-franchise
democracy emerged in some countries, fail to emerge in others, and died in still others.
While the global sample since 1950 offers similar richness, the earlier history gives us better
data on a measurable dimension of political voice not yet quantified for the postwar Third
World, namely the share of adults whose ballot box choices really mattered.  A sample of 24
countries supplies the necessary richness of experience, and of franchise and voting data for
the democracies among them, from the 1880s through the 1930s.
77   It includes an even split
between democracies and autocracies, with movements in both directions between these
types of regimes.
The sample needs to include long lags.  Political regimes are subject to processes of
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social conditions.  The growth of GDP, in the spirit of Barro and other contributors to the
econometrics of global growth, depends on earlier backwardness of the country, and on the
educational attainment of the adult labor force, which is itself an accumulation over earlier
decades.  And government policy toward education, which will affect later economic growth,
is itself a response to recent political and economic history.  I have chosen a time span
between observations that allows these forces to work themselves out.  While an earlier paper
used decades, here I use eight-year intervals between observations.  The observations span as
much history as the data frontier will allow.  Thus the time dimension of the current
historical sample runs consists of eight benchmark years spaced eight years apart: 1881,
1889, 1897, 1905, 1913, 1921, 1929, and 1937.  This particular choice allows us to view
World War I as an event between benchmarks, and also includes the fascist takeovers of
Italy, Germany, and Austria.
This set of 192 historical experiences allows us to identify a causal structure with
three sets of equations.  To summarize the econometrics described in the Appendix to the
longer version of this paper, I shall combine the description of each set of equations with the
results it yielded.
First, the political regime, represented by an autocracy index and the franchise share
among democracies, is a function of its own previous history over 24 years, and of recent
levels of GDP per capita, urbanization, schooling, the state of the global economy, and
whether the country recently lost a war.  The autocracy index ranged from zero, for
democracies and for benign autocracies such as Norway 1898-1913, to 9 or 10 for
Mussolini’s Italy, Nazi Germany, and Thailand.  Autocracy was something close to a random
walk, depending mainly on its own value eight years earlier, though autocracy was also
checked somewhat by the experience of fuller democracy 24 years earlier.  Among
democracies, the extension of the franchise not only depended on its own earlier history, but
was also raised by higher recent income levels (the Lipset effect), and by the embarrassment
of recently losing a war, as in France shortly after 1873, and Austria and Weimar Germany
after World War I.  The rate of voter turnout behaved similarly to this share of the population
enfranchised to vote.
The education channel is followed by a second set of equations, sorting out the
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of the 5-14 age group.  To judge the role of political voice, we must first give other
determinants of public enrollments their due.
78  A higher level of GDP per capita, lagged 8
years, clearly raises primary-school and total enrollments.  A more crowded school-age
cohort, represented by the share of children 5-14 in the total population, depresses enrollment
rates at all levels, presumably because it receives less resources per child.  A dominant
Catholic church cut primary school enrollments by 419 students per 1000 children 5-14,
other things equal, though it did not cut secondary or university enrollments.
Four different kinds of political regime between the 1880s and the 1930s left their
contrasting fingerprints on education, fingerprints like those we have seen in Figure 1 and
Table 1.  The four types to be distinguished here are firm autocracy (e.g. Mussolini’s Italy,
Nazi Germany, and Thailand), benign autocracy (e.g. Norway 1898-1913), elite democracy
(e.g. Britain up to the 1880s), and full-voiced democracy (Switzerland, North America,
Australasia).  Of these four, the two extreme groups provided more primary education, other
things equal.  Both the firmer autocracies and the full democracies committed more public
resources to primary education relative to the alliances of tame monarchs and elite classes in
the other two settings.  Secondary and higher education were another matter.  The full
democracies tended to provide fewer resources here, other things equal.  Granted, twentieth
century North America led the way in public secondary education, but the regression results
imply that this is explained well enough by higher incomes and the lack of a dominant
religion.
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The overall effects on of political regimes on growth flowed through all the historic
channels of institutional influence, not just the education channel.  Once one has given due
credit to the state of the world economy and the country’s own degree of backwardness, firm
autocracy had a negative growth effect, even if it did not retard education.  Presumably the
usual property-rights effects explain much of this clear result.  Among the other kinds of
regimes, we find no clear net differences in the growth effects of benign autocracies, elite
democracies, and full democracies.  While their styles of education policy differed greatly,
the net growth effect was similar.  All presumably benefited from their superior property
rights, which full democracies supplemented with more primary schooling and less higher
education.“Voice and Growth,” Page 32
CONCLUSION
All three Churchills were right about one thing, says the partial evidence assembled
here.  The average democracy has been better for economic growth than the average
autocracy, at least in the formative years before World War II.  Perhaps Lee Kuan Yew is the
exception that proves the bad-autocracy rule he tried to deny. When it comes to wrecking
economies, the tyranny of the majority over the voting minority, popularized by our reading
De Tocqueville, may have been no match for the tyranny over those with no voice at all.
Among democracies, which of the three Churchills was right?  Was the elitist House
of Lords democracy that Churchill the conservative defended in 1947 economically superior
to the full-voice democracy endorsed by the other two Churchills?  As far as GDP per capita
is concerned, they appear to have played to a tie in that formative period.  Yet their policy
styles and their distributive consequences differed.  Compared to elite democracies, fuller
franchises delivered similar growth benefits, and probably greater equality, through primary
schooling and other public investments of the sort that the younger Churchill campaigned for
in 1909.  Britain missed this opportunity in the nineteenth century, when mass primary
schooling was crucial, but Britain caught up in the twentieth.
As history and modernization evolve, the economic benefits of democracy also
evolve.  Back in the seventeenth century, the net benefits might have centered on private
rights to non-human property, for which an elite democracy might have sufficed.  But as the
importance of human skills and individual decision-making discretion grows, autocracy may
obsolesce, just as the gains from slavery obsolesced.
80   This likelihood was well expressed
by a head of state who, like Churchill, offered a summary defense of democracy when he was
out of office.  Korea’s Kim Dae Jung, rebutting Lee Kuan Yew, sees a natural evolution
toward electronic democracy:
The Asian economies are moving from a capital- and labor-intensive industrial phase
into an information- and technology-intensive one.  Many experts have acknowledged
that this new economic world requires guaranteed freedom of information and
creativity.  These things are possible only in a democratic society.  Thus Asia has no“Voice and Growth,” Page 33
practical alternative to democracy; it is a matter of survival in an age of intensifying
competition.  The world economy’s changes have already meant a greater and easier
flow of information, which has helped Asia’s democratization process.”
81
If Kim is right, the human-capital channel may have already become the most
important institution link between political regimes and economic growth.“Voice and Growth,” Page 34
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Regression Equations for Enrollments, Growth,
and Political Regimes, 1881 - 1937
Appendix Table A.   Regression Equations for School Enrollment Rates
per 1000 Children 5-14 , 24 Countries in 1881 - 1937
Dependent variables: Public-school enrollments per 1,000 children 5-14
     (1) primary only (2) primary only
coeff. |t| coeff. |t|
School-age (5-14) share of total pop. -7.80 (2.94) ** -4.59 (1.98) a Primary enroll
ln (GDP/capita), 8 years earlier 167.6 (8.71) ** 117.3 (7.42) ** School-age (5
Religion ln (GDP/capit
Catholic dominance -418.7 (6.46) ** Political regime v
Protestant dominance -154.9 (1.55) Autocracy ind
Political regime variables (see also "Effects" below): Did women vo
Autocracy index (0-10) 2.57 (1.11) 4.42 (2.48) * Franchised as 
Did women vote 8 years earlier? -1.6 (0.10) -3.4 (0.27) Franchised sha
Franchised as a % of population over 20 -0.8 (0.34) -0.6 (0.36) Franchised sha
Franchised share, squared 0.060 (1.15) 0.1 (1.47) Greece in the 
Franchised share, cubed -0.00050 (1.68) a 0.0 (2.10) * Constant term
Constant term -506.6 (2.87) -149.6 (1.00)
Allowing for 2
Allowing for 23 fixed country effects? No Yes
"R sq.,"  equation
"R sq.,"  equation F-statistic .574 28.7 .879 46.6 Mean of the dep. 
Mean of the dep. var., std. error of estim. 550.42 0.98 550.42 0.97 Number of non-ze
Effects of selected
Effects of selected shifts toward more electoral democracy: (a) from benign n
(a) from benign non-democracy to 30% franchis 16.6 (0.51) 20.08 (0.85) (b) from 30% fran
(b) from 30% franchise to 80% franchise 48.2 (1.49) 51.26 (2.11) * (c) from benign n
(c) from benign non-democracy to 80% franchis 64.8 (3.21) ** 71.35 (4.06) ** (d) from benign n
(d) from benign non-democracy to 100% franch 21.3 (1.21) 31.15 (1.92) a
Type of equation
Type of equation       pooled GLS       pooled GLS
(** = significant a
(** = significant at the 1% level, two-tail; * = significant at the 5% level; a = significant
a = significant at the 7% level; b = significant at the 10% level.)
Notes and sources to Table A:Appendix Table A, continued  
Dependent variables: Enrollments per 1,000 children 5-14
(3) primary plus (4) university
secondary (public) (public + private)
coeff. |t| coeff. |t|
lment rate, 8 years earlier 0.82 ##### ** -0.0018 (0.52)
-14) share of total pop. -2.8 (1.48) -0.7 (4.21) **
a), 8 years earlier 79.3 (6.78) ** 6.6 (5.63) **
variables (see also "Effects" below):
dex (0-10) 1.2 (0.80) -0.17 (1.16)
ote 8 years earlier? -3.8 (0.31) 5.0 (5.14) **
a % of population over 20 -0.78 (0.39) 0.43 (3.01) **
are, squared 0.030 (0.63) -0.011 (3.32) **
are, cubed ###### (0.77) ####### (3.40) **
1920s (secondary overcounted) 101.1 (2.83) ** -5.6 (2.16) *
m -421.3 (4.34) -31.2 #####
23 fixed country effects? Yes Yes
n F-statistic .983 338.0 .793
var., std. error of estim. 581.8 0.97 5.6 3.09
ero observations, out of 192 7
d shifts toward more electoral democracy:
non-democracy to 30% franchis -2.6 (0.10) 1.5 (2.46) *
nchise to 80% franchise 18.8 (0.65) -2.3 (3.44) **
non-democracy to 80% franchis 16.2 (0.99) -0.8 (2.21) *
non-democracy to 100% franchi 1.3 (0.11) -0.2 (0.56)
      pooled GLS tobit
at the 1% level, two-tail; * = significant at the 5% level;
t at the 7% level; b = significant at the 10% level.)Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Siam/Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The eight benchmark years
are spaced eight years apart:  1881, 1889, 1897, 1905, 1913, 1921, 1929, and 1937. 
The fact that territorial boundaries changed across World War I (e.g. from the Austrian half 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Austria alone) should pose no problem here, given that the
sample is intended to capture political changes.  The only likely violation of the usual statistical 
assumptions comes from the fact that serial correlation behavior might not be consistent if the
geography of the country changed.  
The enrollment rates are from Lindert, "Democracy, Decentralization, and Mass Schooling before 1914,"
University of California - Davis, Working Papers 104 and 105 (April 2001), Appendix A.  To
interpolate between my decadal benchmark estimates, I used some of the enrollment figures from
the Arthur S. Banks CD-ROM for 1815-1999.  But in some cases, especially the UK, I prefer mr own
estimates over those than Banks presents without citing his sources.  
The franchised are the shares of the over-20 population legally entitled to vote, in settings where
I judged the voting power to be real (see below).  For years when women were not yet entitled to vote, 
the over-20 population refers to men only.  Alternative regressions used the actual voter turnout
instead of the franchise share used here.  The results were qualitatively the same, both in the 
regressions using voter turnout and in similar regressions on the 1880-1930 decadal sample results
reported in agricultural History Center Working Papers 104 and 105.  The franchise and voting
shares are from the Arthur S. Banks cross-polity CD-ROM for 1815-1999, which draws them 
mainly from Mackie and Rose (1991).  The autocracy index is from the Polity 98 version
the Gurr-Jaggers  Polity data set.
The franchised voting power was judg ed to be illusory and not real in cases where the Banks indexes
and the Mackie description of franchise institutions suggested that voters had little power
over the legislature and the chief executive, despite their actually voting in legislative elections.
Thus I entered zeroes for the franchise in these cases where elections were actually held:
Belgium, Germany and Italy up to World War I; Norway to 1882, and Sweden to 1907.
Both the autocracy index and the franchised shares are predicted values, rather than actual
    observed values.  The instrumental-variable equations generating these predictions are
the political-regime equations in Appendix Table C.Protestant dominance = the corresponding majority margin for Protestant countries, with some
cases judged to involve no dominance despite a Protestant majority.  It equals nearly 0.50 for
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.  It equals 0.16 for the UK before the separation of 
Ireland, and 0.10 for 1921-1937.
The religion data are mostly from Annuaire Statistique de la France for the 1930s.  Those from 
France, the UK and  a few other countries are from encyclopedias, in some cases for postwar years. 
"Benign" non-democracy here refers to a polity with an autocracy rating of zero, but with enough 
impediments to legislative effectiveness and enough power of the monarch for me to disregard 
any suffrage rates, setting them at zero despite the occurrence of elections.  The only pure example
in the sample is Norway 1898-1913, though prewar Belgium came close, with autocracy = 1.
For Greece in the 1920s, I used the Banks data series on secondary and higher education rather than
the less complete Mitchell series.  However, the Banks series seems to overcount secondary 
enrollments, partly at the expense of tertiary enrollments.  This necessitated adding the 
"Greece in the 1920s" variable to capture the temporary miscount.
The test statistics listed under "effects" at the bottom of the table start from the most limited
autocracies, those with a Polity AUTOC index of 0, combined with my judgment that they  
were nonetheless not democracies.  For stricter autocracies, note the autocracy index coefficient.
Regressions were run using the POOL command in SHAZAM 8.0, using the option that sets the
same first-order rho coefficient for all countries in making the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation.  Table 1. Three Fingerprints of Elite Bias in Education Policy - 
India versus Other Countries in the mid-1980s
Fingerprint #1 Fingerprint # 2 Fingerprint #3 
(below-average (above-average (above-average
values suggest values suggest values suggest
elitist bias) elitist bias) elitist bias)
Public tertiary-
Public primary education Mid-1980s inequality
expenditure expenditures of public funds among
per child of per pupil / students ranked by Memorandum:
primary-school public pre-prim. + educational attainment GDP/capita
age as a % of primary expend. for 1985, 
GDP/capita per child of For 10% in 1990 $,
mid-1980s primary-school age Gini best-educated per Maddison
Bangladesh 3.4 83.3 .82 72.0 577
China 7.9 25.2 .44 31.0 1522
India 5.4 36.8 .66 61.0 1079
Indonesia 13.7 6.7 .27 21.0 1972
Korea, Repub. of 12.7 5.6 .16 13.0 5670
Malaysia 14.0 13.6 .38 32.0 4157
Nepal 7.0 35.5 .57 54.0 713
Pakistan 4.0 31.8 1400
Philippines 5.8 8.7 .19 14.0 1964
Singapore 8.4 7.7 10896
Sri Lanka 6.2 13.4 .33 28.0 2234
Thailand 13.7 2.9 .33 23.0 3054
Papua New Guinea 19.8 53.0 .62 54.0 3497a
Ten Asian nations 8.5 17.5 .43 36.3
Japan, 1995 17.3 0.9 15332
United States 15.7 1.4 20717
OECD average, 1988 17.3 2.0
Sources and notes to Table 1:
a = From Penn World Tables 6.0, not from Maddison.
The sources are Unesco, World Education Report 1998, and Tan and Mingat, Education in Asia.
The ten Asian nations averaged together are Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea,
       Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.  
for Fingerprint #3, a  one-year profile is used to synthesize the whole educational cycle.
The Unesco source, used here for Pakistan, Singapore, and Japan, allows the calculation of the support
       ratio through two different methods. They do not give the same answers, however.
       One possible source of discrepancy is the inclusion of pre-primary expenditures with the primary
       school estimates.  